This article presents the case for IT transformation and big data for safety risk management on the GB railways. This article explains why the interest in data-driven safety solutions is very high in the railways by describing the drivers that shape risk management for the railways. A brief overview of research projects in the big data risk analysis programme supports the case and helps understand the research agenda for the transformation of safety and risk on the GB railways. The drivers and the projects provide insight in the current research needs for the transformation and explains why safety researchers have to broaden their skill set to include digital skills and potentially even programming. The case for IT transformation of risk management systems is compelling, and this article describes just the tip of the iceberg of opportunities opening up for safety analysis that, after all, depends on data.
Introduction
Computer scientists are clear in their belief that the data revolution is coming of age: there is a firm belief that the enormous amounts of data collected will inevitably lead to a revolution in how management will be undertaken in the future. [1] [2] [3] Yet, to date, the potential benefit of this revolution has barely been investigated for safety and risk management.
The term big data has been created to describe the methods and techniques that process and extract meaning from very large amounts of data; despite being very widely used, there is no common definition of the term. [4] [5] [6] The broad interpretation is that big data systems economically extract value from huge volumes of a variety of data sources very quickly (leading to the Three Vs definition of big data: volume, variety, and velocity). A sceptical view is that this definition we can imagine that big data is simply another fad to describe a step forward in the evolution of management decision support tools or business intelligence (BI) systems. In this work, however, we take a more optimistic view where big data creates opportunities for intelligent systems. In fact, the design of purpose-built IT systems is not the principal concern in this article, it is the development of a form of machine-assisted interpretation (perhaps resembling intelligence) in the form of a software layer that bridges the gap between data sources and the theoretical and practical mechanisms to deliver safety on the railways. This bypasses the need to specify what the data should look like to support the safety system precisely and perfectly. Instead, the extraction of safety-relevant information and safety lessons is guided by theoretical and practical safety principles applied on existing data. That were not necessarily purposefully designed for safety analysis or safety systems. With this approach, data drives safety rather than the other way around. This creates opportunities in the development of new safety solutions, but it comes at a cost that some safety issues are difficult to 1 capture with existing data streams or data may simply be absent.
This article describes the approach that shapes risk management for the GB railways that inexorably leads to data-driven intelligent safety solutions and thereby explains the heightened interest in data-driven safety solutions. The drivers are explained by re-iterating common principles for managing railway safety and setting them against the greater global trends in IT and big data on the railways.
Drivers for IT transformation and big data risk analysis
Common principles for railway safety System safety management is the application of technical and managerial techniques to the systematic, forward-looking identification and control of hazards throughout the life cycle of a project or activity. It calls for structured and rigorous identification and analysis of hazards, as well as the establishment of processes for change management, decision-making, implementation of risk controls, and on-going monitoring of safety.
Principle 1: serious accidents are not tolerated. The prevention of serious accidents is a key focus of all railway partners. Accidents involving trains are disruptive, costly and cause human suffering, all of which damage the rail industry as a whole. Extensive media coverage on train accidents inevitably shapes public opinion regarding railway safety: in general, the public abhors rail accidents but tends to be unwilling to fund safety investment (through fare or tax increases) or tolerate operational restrictions (such as speed restrictions). In very broad terms, public abhorrence influences the design of legislation requirements and the level of operational safety performance. The codification of public opinion and trade-off between law, safety performance, and operational performance is unique to each country in the world and may vary widely from one country to another. In the United Kingdom, 'societal concern' is outside of the scope of legal responsibility for safety. Nevertheless, official bodies, such as the Office of Rail and Road and the Railway Accident Investigation Board, have some degree of freedom when it comes to focussing attention to inspection and prosecution within the framework of legislative requirements.
Principle 2: railway engineering for safety is of high integrity. Through continuous and determined effort to improve safety, a very high standard has been set for the safety integrity of railway engineering, but this integrity comes at a high price, both in terms of the direct cost of equipment, but also the cost of safety management systems (SMSs) to operate the railway. A challenge for any railway is to reduce these costs while still operating a safe and efficient railway. This challenge is often met with the application of advanced technological systems such as the ones described in this article.
Principle 3: the railways must not become less safe than they currently are. The closer that rail safety moves towards absolute safety, the more difficult it becomes to achieve further improvements, or even maintain the status quo. Continuous development is constrained by increasing costs, technological limitations and the fundamental need to keep railway traffic moving to support the economy at large. One way to keep ahead in this challenge is to employ research in safety and reliability management. The GB railways have consistently been the safest in Europe, which makes it especially prone to a reversal of the safety record and drives it to the edge of technology for even better safety performance.
IT trends for railway safety
In many ways, the extensive use of data systems in business is not a novelty. However, with increasing maturity of BI systems, comprehensive digitized SMSs are becoming more common.
Trend 1: the global digitalization trend. The global effort for IT transformation of business is hard to capture in a few words. It is served by a huge academic society and a massive industry. Areas of attention include the following: hardware development, algorithms to improve data storage and access, algorithms to reduce processing time, novel concepts for high-performance computing, and elaborate enterprise software techniques. The added value of these areas is that IT systems become better at supporting businesses. 1, [7] [8] [9] Academic domains for creating solutions include research in software systems, 10 ontologies, 11 artificial intelligence (AI), 12 and business process modeling. 13 Big data is a label for the global digitalization trend that powers global business change and drives the digitalization of railways and railway safety. The label may change over time, but the global effort for the development of digital systems does not.
These developments are entering the GB railways and offer substantial advantages to the industry as a whole. The Technical Strategy Leadership Group (TSLG) 14 report addresses the ambitions of the GB railways to embark on this journey of technological advancement in IT.
Trend 2: datafication of railways. Big data project are appearing in the railways. [15] [16] [17] [18] A particular area of interest is asset management with radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems. [19] [20] [21] [22] Although the works contain some references to safe operation, they do not deal with safety or risk management. Another data-hungry domain is condition monitoring: detectors attached to trains and rails are collecting and analysing huge amounts of data that would have been unmanageable until relatively recent advances in technology. 23, 24 European research projects such as 'Intelligent integration of railway systems' (InteGRail) 25 and 'Automated and cost effective railway infrastructure maintenance' (ACEM-Rail) 26 pave the way for the datafication of the railways. The direction that these projects take are further supported by underlying work that provides the data modelling tools required to manage big data projects for infrastructure such as the RailML 27 framework that was developed by the International Union of Railways (UIC). The railways embrace the digital transformation as an opportunity for improvement. Investigations into driverless trains, remote condition monitoring, digital ticketing, and intermodal data interchange to support freight transport between ports and the railways are performed by railway organizations around the world. European infrastructure managers are making data-live feeds available to support this effort. [28] [29] [30] [31] Within the GB railways, big data activities are underway, such as the Offering Rail Better Information Services (ORBIS) project in Network Rail 32 and rail condition monitoring. 24 Trend 3: increased use of data-driven safety risk controls. The traditional methods of safety risk management include well-tested techniques such as hazard and operability study (HAZOP), failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA), and fault tree analysis. Traditionally, individual risk models are fed by dedicated databases that provide cleansed data in a dedicated format for use in the risk model. These databases can be very large, for example, the SMIS database that is used to populate the safety risk model (SRM) for the GB railways contains more than 2 million records. Such databases are required to support risk-based decision-making based on evidence.
But it is not just risk management systems that are evidence-based. Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) analyses form the backbone for the approval of technical systems on the railway (namely, EN50126, EN50128, and EN50129). When it comes to the implementation of advanced engineering systems, advanced tools help deal with the complexity of technical systems and safety-critical software systems but tend to be data-intensive. Examples include the following: HipHops, 33 advanced safety case management, 34 and software verification. [35] [36] [37] This development has inspired the development of advanced computer languages to represent risk scenarios. 38 Railway traffic management is a particularly challenging area, and today's signalling systems are based on fully integrated technical systems hosted by data centres.
In the United Kingdom, the digital railway programme paces the digital transformation forward using ERTMS as a driver for the digital transformation of the railways.
39,40
Trend 4: IT supported SMSs. The SRM 41, 42 estimates risk from the full range of 'hazardous events' that might arise on the GB railways by estimating the frequency of these events, the likelihood of their various potential consequences, and the severity of these consequences. Train accidents, and other high-severity, low-frequency events, are estimated using detailed fault tree and event tree models, which were developed to provide a structured representation of the cause and consequences of potential accidents arising from the operation and maintenance of the railway. The model is fed with data from the safety management information system that contains more than 2 million data points. The SRM is supported by individual risk models that have been developed by RSSB and other railway companies in the United Kingdom for specific railway risks such as the Signal Overrun Risk Assessment Tool (SORAT), which analyses collision risk related to signalling layout design, and the All Level Crossing Risk Model, which looks at the risk from level crossings. It is the continued improvement of the SRM and other risk models that steers towards big data SMSs. Thereby changing from IT supported systems to systems where IT provides interpretation and intelligence.
Trend 5: big data for safety science. An example of a big data safety system is the GeoSRM risk model to deal with localized risks. 43 The pilot model is based on the SRM, but the fundamental difference between the two models is that the GeoSRM shows, on a map, how risk is distributed across the network, rather than generating a single national estimate for each type of event. A particular issue arose in the preparation of data: huge amounts of data were needed to populate the localized models, including not just safety incident data, but also timetable data and asset information. The GeoSRM pilot model has been proven with a subset of data dealing with risk profiles for derailment, suicides, and station slips, trips and falls for the 'Wessex' route in the South West of England.
Remember that we make a distinction between IT systems and data analytics in the sense that the latter depends on machine-assisted interpretation. The difference being that we do not specify what the data ought to look like for the purpose of safety management, but we take the data as it is and construct interpretation algorithms to extract safety learning from it. A paper published in 2015 cautiously approaches the problem by focussing on the dangers of using big data and the potential security risks and risk associated with loss of data and limitations to interpretation of data, 44 but a paper from that same year describes an analytic system to analyse human reliability. 45 The latter describes a computer-based text interpretation engine to extract factors pertaining to training in nuclear power plants;
an engine to populate a Bayesian belief net that is changed based on the findings of the interpretation and subsequently calculates the network to assess training quality on the nuclear site. A paper from the construction of a metro system in Wuhan describes how visual recordings and text-based commentaries are combined to detect and monitor unsafe behavior. 46 An investigation in the United Kingdom extracted evidence from train data recorders to analyse the mental and physical demand on drives while they are driving trains. 47 Those researchers also created automated interpretation algorithms to extract safety-relevant intelligence from a data source that was not designed for that use. The final paper that relates big data and risk does not treat a safety solution but elaborates on developments for risk in relation to asset reliability and industrial systems reliability. 48 Although reliability is outside the scope of this article, the overview provides three clear visions for risk research in the near future: technological advances in BI (combining analysis methods and improve mining methods); system security and reliability (pertaining on the risks to the IT system itself); and advances in operational risk management, including the development of operational risk management frameworks.
Several safety software suppliers have embraced software solutions to deal with large data streams and harnessing potential for big data analytics. These solutions tend to use Bowties as their centre piece. In 2016, a paper by DNV describes the concepts for dynamic barrier management with an explicit reference to linking databases containing audits, barrier sensor data, control system data, incident data, maintenance records, and personnel data to barrier monitoring systems. 49 Especially for sensor data and control system data, which are not purposefully built for the safety control system, machine interpretation of mixed data sources is used. In 2016, CGE launched a cloud-based Bowtie solution 50 to enable the big data approach. These developments have mostly come from the developments in the field of dynamic barrier management, an area that has received attention for a long time and also started incorporating machine interpretation. 51 The case for IT transformation of safety management
The case for IT transformation of safety management on the GB railways is made by the combination of the constant strive for safer railways and the relentless ingress of IT solutions in the railways and railway safety management. It is sensible to consider a systems approach to the IT transformation for SMSs rather than working from individual technological solutions.
Safety activities must be integrated with all parts of the railway system for it to be effective and efficient. 52 A large part of the safety activities is delivered through SMSs that aim to be holistic. This makes safety management an inclusive business process that, in principle, can be transformed into a big data business process.
This part of this article demonstrated that the choice for investigating whether big data solutions that incorporate machine interpretation could benefit safety and risk for the railways in Britain. The arrival of big data management techniques for the railways provides a signpost to where risk management techniques may develop in the future. Yet, the shape of things to come is unclear, which leads to core research question for the big data risk analysis (BDRA) research programme: how can big data techniques, exploiting machine interpretation of huge data sets, be used most effectively to transform SMSs for railway safety? The next part treats some projects in the BDRA research programme which shed some light into answering this question.
Introducing machine-assisted interpretation and intelligence: BDRA
The BDRA research programme is a joint effort by RSSB and the Institute of Railway Research at the University of Huddersfield that investigates the potential for machine interpretation techniques for Safety. The objective is to investigate to what extent big data techniques, with a particular emphasis on machineassisted interpretation, can support the current SRM of RSSB and to investigate whether the modern data analytic methods will change traditional risk analysis methods, and if so, how. The overview in the next two sections helps understand which alleys are investigated for the transformation of safety and risk on the GB railways. Six projects that are discussed, they were set up as relatively independent projects to investigate different aspects of BDRA. Due to their differences, these projects provide a broad overview of the usefulness of big data to railway safety. For most of the projects, progress has been described in other papers so only a summary is repeated here. The projects discussed here are the following: on-train data recorder (OTDR)-based signal passed at danger (SPAD)-safety indicator, red aspect approach to signals (RAATS), learning from text-based close call records, visual analytics (VA), ontology, and SMIS + . The first project will be treated in more detail because it is not described elsewhere and it provides insight in skills that future safety analysts will have to embrace to perform safety data analyses.
A BDRA project: leading SPAD safety indicator from OTDR
SPAD risks
An SPAD constitutes a serious breach of safety. When a signal is at danger, showing a red aspect, a train does not have the authority to proceed because the line is occupied. To some extent, it is similar to a red light in a road; it immediately puts the vehicle at risk from colliding into another one. In GB railway signalling, however, the driver has warning systems at their disposal. For the route considered in this work, the warning signals work as follows. If the line ahead is clear, a signal shows a green aspect, indicating that it is safe to proceed. A double yellow indicates that the next signal is showing a yellow signal but the train may proceed as normal. A single yellow indicates that the driver has to prepare to stop at the next signal that could be red. A red signal indicates that stopping is obligatory. The driver is supported by a signalling system that is relevant for this discussion: automatic warning system (AWS). An AWS horn is triggered with a magnet on the rails (typically at about 180 m before the signal, depending on the line speed) that indicates that the next signal is a restrictive aspect (not green). The driver has 2.4 s to acknowledge the horn by pushing a button, if the button is not pressed, the train will brake automatically, thereby supporting the driver in preventing a SPAD.
OTDR data
OTDRs are used to collect data from trains, to assess how they are driven and the state of various train systems during its journey. Examples of data collected include power and brake controller position, driver acknowledgement of signalling system warnings, whether the doors are open, the operation of driver's reminder appliance and the emergency bypass switch systems, and the operation of the brake system. OTDR data are also used in the following: Incident/accident investigation; Automated train condition monitoring, for example, train automatic performance analysis system (TAPAS) condition monitoring system processes data recorded by OTDR to identify the required maintenance for trains; 53 Automated driver assessment, for example, TAPAS and Churros process OTDR data to estimate a number of speed indictors, such as the speed at which power Notch 4 is selected when accelerating.
This project extends the use of OTDR data to leading indicators for SPAD risk.
Method: data cleansing
OTDR raw data from a single class of trains are received in their native or 'raw' data format. This format is optimized for compactness and has to be reformatted before it can be analysed. The initial handling examines types and format of data channels (that appear in rows) and corrects them if needed. The two corrections are correcting notation of time and filling out missing data. The latter is helpful in the analysis as some channels only record changes of state (and do not record any data while the state remains the same) and some channels do not record zeroes. The changes have been manually checked against a manual extraction process using Excel. To automate the correction of data format, an R script illustrated by Figure 1 has been written. Stage 1 simply turns the raw data into a CSV file format. The second stage converts relative journey into seconds: ' + 01h24mn26s6' to '5066.6' s. Stage 3 corrects for slightly differing times from different data channels. This is required because a relative journey time record appears more than once with different groups of variables (i.e. for the same time record, there are more than one input line from different data channels). A process was carried out to compress all variables occurred at the same time in a single data row. In Stage 4, all the missing data were filled using different logical processes, for example: Merging speed information from two different columns of the data source into a single column; Filling the missing values of train distance with calculated distance based on the available time duration and train speed.
This particular error checking is specific to train class used in this study. Other classes that use other data systems to record OTDR will need similar error handling and cleansing routines to make it useable.
Method: approaching a red aspect
The train speed when the driver receives the last AWS horn prior to a red signal is considered a leading indicator for SPADs. A high speed when approaching a red signal may cause a SPAD or lead to a full brake application to stop the train at the correct location, about 20 m away from the red signal. An algorithm was developed to read the train speeds when the driver receives the last AWS horn before a red signal. The algorithm differentiates between trains stopping at a station or a red signal by checking door release as illustrated in Figure 2 . When the train stops without a subsequent door release (so, when the train is approaching a signal outside a train station), the AWS horn event is identified from the AWS channel measurements. If there are a number of AWS horns during the period under investigation, the time of last horn is extracted along with the train speed. The procedure was not optimized for computational speed; this is a subject of further work.
Results and discussion
A number of routes were investigated. The variation in the train speed at receiving the AWS last horn is given in table 1. The table shows a number of services, how many red aspects it approached during that service, and the maximum speed at AWS horn recorded for any red aspect approached at the red aspect. For one of the approaches, the speed is higher than the recommended 20 mile/h but only by a small margin. Further analysis showed that this train could come to a standstill at the red signal with the lowest braking step if it were immediately activated.
Although the results of this analysis do not seem very spectacular, it has important consequences for the GB railways, especially when the analysis is scaled up to include all trains in GB in which case it provides a national leading indicator for SPAD risks. When the indicator keeps rising on a national level, it is worth investigating the cause of the national rise. The number is potentially also useful for smaller parts of the GB railways: operating companies can compare their safety performance, high-risk routes can be identified, and particularly troublesome signal locations can be redesigned. Railway partners in GB now have to consider the desired use of this, and other digital safety solutions going forward in the future.
Also, the seemingly straightforward result hides the fact that the development of safety-inspired data systems is not a straightforward task at all. Data from different sources, recording different channels and storing them in different ways have to be harmonized, and technical flaws have to be corrected (such as different times recorded in different data channels) and harmonized, and the system has to be scaled up to a national digital system. In theory, digital interoperability language, such as RailML, 27 can be used for that, but it is technically challenging and requires constant review by safety experts to ensure that the desired safety outcome is met. This means that safety experts have to upgrade their skill set with knowledge about digital systems and, preferably, programming if they are to assess modern safety solutions.
Succinct description of published BDRA projects

RAATS
In the RAATS project, SPAD risks are assessed by identifying how many times trains approach a signal when it is displaying a red aspect. 54 Traditionally, this frequency is estimated from counting samples on trains. This project increases the sample set to all connected signalling systems, which covers about 70% of the GB railway network.
The source of the information used in the RAATS software is Train Describer (TD) data. 55 A TD is an electronic device connected to each signalling panel which provides a description of each train (its 'headcode') and which section of track (or 'track section') it currently occupies. RAATS software reads the TD live feed, stores it in a database, calculates which trains actually approach a red aspect, and presents the data in a graphical interface or creates an excel file for further analysis. The approaches to signals for a single signal can be analysed over a period from a single day to a period of a year. Alternatively, the user can choose to analyse all signals in a TD-area or indeed all the signals in the database. In this way, RAATS software provides intricate details about the number of trains approaching a signal at danger and helps identify high-risk signals. This information can be used in subsequent risk analyses for signals. The full scientific description is given by Zhao et al. 54 
Safety learning from close calls
A close call is a hazardous situation where the event sequence could lead to an accident if it had not been interrupted by a planned intervention or by random event. 56 Network Rail workers and specific subcontractors within the GB railway industry are asked to report such events in the 'Close Call' database. Close Call reports are freeform text reports where anyone can enter a situation that, in their view, could have led to an accident. This leaves the reporter with more freedom to report what they think are dangerous situations and could, in theory, lead to a richer data source for railway safety issues. The Close Call database collects approximately 150,000 entries annually. Due to the large number of records, it is impractical to manually review the records, and therefore, computer-based techniques have been developed to extract safetyrelevant information from them.
Since the key safety information is embedded in text, natural language processing (NLP) is used. NLP techniques have been an emerging area of study over the past two decades. [57] [58] [59] [60] One of the key problems is the inherent ambiguity in written language. These include jargon, abbreviations, misspelling, and lack of punctuation. Processing of Close Call data by extracting information from free text involves five processes:
Text cleansing, tokenizing, and tagging; Ontology parsing and coding (creation of a taxonomy of related words); Clustering (creation of groups of records that are semantically similar); Text analysis; Information extraction.
As this process description suggests, a sensible automated text analysis is complicated. The exact procedure is elsewhere. 60 This article highlights two investigations for the information extraction process.
The first investigation is the identification of incidents with track workers. The SMIS database (GB reportable incident database for railways) shows that incidents with track workers take place most frequently in the hours between 11:00 and 15:00. The analysis was performed to investigate whether the same pattern is present in the Close Call database. An automated search query was programmed to retrieve the protection/possession arrangement events in the Close Call database as function of time-of-day. The results are compared SMIS data. The relative distributions of these events by time of day are shown in Figure 4 . The figure illustrates that the SMIS incident database and Close Call reports follow similar trends during the day. Unfortunately, the times at which reports are made trend for all close calls are similar to the times reports are made for protection arrangements, which suggests that reporting bias may interfere.
The high fraction of Close Call events between 00:00 and 01:00 is due to a default of the reporting system that sets the timestamp to 00:00 when the time of the incident is not entered by the person making the entry. This correction is made more frequently with the Close Call database than the SMIS database since there is less rigorous quality control on Close Call reports.
The second investigation is a similar problem but now focussed on trespass. The question was whether trespasses take place at certain times of the day or equal probability throughout the day? Figure 5 shows the frequency of occurrence for trespass based on automated identification of trespass events in the Close Call database. Note that trespass does not occur with equal frequency throughout the day. The trend seems that they occur more frequently during working hours. What causes this trend is as yet unexplained but similar to the possession entries, reporting bias may play a role. The journal paper describing this project in detail is published elsewhere. 61 
VA
VA enhances the analysis and discovery of information from data; it engages creative interpretations in humans beyond those that a computer can detect automatically. 62 VA enables interactive learning with computers, which makes it quick and efficient and potentially enables better decisions. [63] [64] [65] The investigation featured here analyses a data set of 500 records that were a random sample of 12,171 Slip, Trip, and Fall Close Call records. The text was preprocessed to eliminate anomalies that could obscure the text analysis. For instance, essential multi-words that represent one concept are detected to used to create a unique tokens (e.g. TRIPPING_HAZARD_ and NETWORK_RAIL_) and information of places, codes, numbers, or measured entities are condensed into tags (e.g. GEO_PLACE and _CODE_).
The cleansed text was transformed into a network building its word-per-word co-occurrence matrix. The nodes of the matrix are words of the text, tokens, or tags. This matrix maps the nodes of a network into pairs of nodes, and it is a common input for visualization tools. Figure 6 shows part of the word network that was created; it identifies missing covers and trough lids as causes for slip, trip, and fall incidents. The journal paper describing this project in detail is published elsewhere. 66 
Ontologies
Railways have primarily used ontologies for describing railway systems in order to support traceability of information in data integration processes and design engineering processes. [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] The combination of information from different railway data sources can provide valuable insights about the railway system and its engineering processes; however, it requires a complete and structured data in order to analyse them. For instance, in the TD feed, a piece of track is referred to as a block number but in Close Call, a distance from a station indicates that same piece of track. So, it is necessary to define a common vocabulary between the systems or knowledge domains that allows the communication between them. Ontologies are key enablers for the exchange of information in data fusion since they help to maintain the context (semantics) when information is used in conjunction. Moreover, ontologies can be shared by railway operators that are in competition, helping to distinguish between shared information (such as accident reports) and intellectual property that should not be shared This work was not published in a journal but in a technical report. 72 The RAATS project uses a hard-coded ontology to extract relevant information from the live stream TD feed. Concepts that it uses for extracting the right information include the following: train head codes (e.g. 1F98), timestamps (unix timestamp, e.g. 1458649435), TD areas (e.g. MP), signal ID's (e.g. MP1201), and Berth ID's (e.g. 1201). Concepts that it uses for analysis include: GRN (not a Red Aspect Approach incident), Cleared Stopped at Signal (CSS), Cleared Approaching at Signal (CAS), and Cleared Not Visible (CNV) to describe the various types of red aspect approaches. The dissemination ontology includes the following: time windows, geographical areas, input concepts, and analysis concepts. The ontology is a lightweight ontology with high specificity and direct application in a software system. Figure 7 shows the input ontology alongside a single data entry. 54 
SMIS +
Alongside the BDRA research programme, RSSB is in the process of completely modernizing the SRM and the tools around it to revolutionize safety risk management and decision support. The SMIS + programme is underway which provides an opportunity to systematically capture the data that is required to perform localized analyses, in a format that can be readily used to support risk modelling and analysis. The programme upgrades SMIS and creates a new cloud-based online system exploiting commercial off-the-shelf, state of the art, enterprise safety management software. The system has been specified taking into account the data needs of the SRM and the GeoSRM, as well as through consideration of a huge number of Railway specific 'bowtie' models developed by RSSB, following significant work on bow-ties across the Rail Industry in Great Britain. The system incorporates the collection of information around the safety incidents currently reported into SMIS, but will also capture data relating to Close Calls as representatives for precursor incidents or breaches in safety management controls. The SMIS + programme will offer industry a more intuitive and powerful tool to report and track all safety-related incidents in a new common format. The SMIS + platform offers a platform for the development of advanced BI features that will also allow stakeholders to create their own local safety performance dashboards. A more detailed description is given elsewhere. 73 
Challenges and research issues
This part of this article focussed on brief descriptions of research projects in the BDRA programme. The projects demonstrate potential of the big data techniques for the safety and risk sciences; this section highlights challenges and research issues.
Invariably, more data enable a richer risk analysis. More data hold the promise of better evidence to support safety and risk analyses which, when processed adequately, informs decision-making and prognostics. However, extracting the right information is not straightforward. On an operational research level, the challenges are mostly related to a skill gap. To be able to implement big data techniques, safety researchers need to understand data and databases. For example, RAATs has to deal with almost 800,000,000 messages per year. Parts of the data are corrupted, parts of the data are conflicting, and parts are simply absent. Safety scientists need to learn to work with a variety of huge databases that invariably contain imperfections. We found that extracting data could not simply be delegated to programmers; researchers need to understand databases to work with them or to instruct them effectively. In a similar way, safety scientists need to understand data visualization, analytics software, NLP, and ontologies. Put it another way, safety scientists have to become proficient with basic computer science, IT systems, and especially databases.
A richer data environment is essential for a number of concepts in safety science. First, there is the concept that more information from near misses could strengthen the evidence base for risk analyses (which may be viewed as the contested 'iceberg' theory that saw its first iteration with Heinrich's triangle). The Close Call database was set up for that purpose. With 150,000 text records per year and automated natural language interpretation, its scientific foundations can be investigated more rigorously than before. Interestingly, the Safety II approach also depends on integrating more data, even if that are on successes rather than failures. From the data analytics approach, however, the problems are similar: a justified and effective integration of different data sources is required. Providing the rationale and justification for integration the integration of imperfect data sources is a scientific challenge for safety research in the near future. Another area where efficient integration of databases is required is dynamic barrier management; it depends on online systems that gather data from different databases that could be physically distributed over the world. Integration of such data depends on sensible risk ontologies and clear visualization (e.g. in a bowtie). Although the concept is relatively straightforward, its technical development is challenging even with modern Enterprise IT systems. Safety scientists will have to develop knowledge management systems based on ontologies that define and map out the relationship between concepts in safety and translate them into machine-readable systems.
Safety Scientists will be confronted with new methods and solutions and will have to assess their scientific validity for the safety sciences. The word cloud in Figure 6 is an example of a new method: a wellestablished clustering technique now contains words that have meaning for safety and risk analysts. Safety scientists will have to contemplate whether such techniques are valid for use in SMSs and if so, under what conditions they are acceptable. This is just one example, but computer scientists continue to develop tools and solutions that safety scientists will have to consider at some point in the near future.
Finally, safety scientists will be confronted with AI solutions in the near future. AI presents a special problem for safety solutions in the sense that it is a blackbox approach: users do not know what goes on inside. This creates an issue with trust: can we trust AI to make safety-critical decisions on a management level? And if AI made a decision that turned out to cost lives, who is liable? One way of dealing with AI is to assess its performance against benchmark systems, but which systems would be sufficiently reliable to do that?
Conclusion
This article presents the case for opening our minds to big data analytics, machine-assisted interpretation, and BI in safety management. It describes the drivers that shape the research, initial experiences with data systems for safety, and sheds light on challenges and scientific issues. The case is compelling and worthy of our attention, but it also shows that safety analysts have to adjust their skill set to be future-proof. In that sense, this work contributes to the way forward in the integration of computer science and the safety sciences. What remains is to define what BDRA systems actually are. We suggest the following: BDRA systems are IT solution systems that:
Extract information from data with high volume, variety, and velocity; Interpret the data quickly with a collection of software applications; Extract relevant safety and risk intelligence to populate; Online interfaces to connect the right people at the right time in order; Provide decision support for safety and risk management.
The process of redesigning traditional SMSs or their digitized counterparts, we shall call SMS transformation. The design of software solutions for SMS transformations, we shall call safety enterprise architecture.
We suggest that research focusses on three key areas: design and specification of safety data models and safety databases that handle high volume, variety, and velocity data which involves using distributed file systems to manage the scale of the data; safety ontologies and VA that function as facilitators for the fusion of data sources and machine-assisted interpretation; and AI solutions to extract safety information from big data. We believe that this article describes just the tip of the iceberg of opportunities opening up for safety analysis that, after all, depends on data.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the RSSB-Huddersfield strategic partnership according to the MoU of 8 August 2013.
